

BIENNIAL REPORT

OF THE

Adjutant General

OF

ILLINOIS

TO THE

GOVERNOR
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

1907-1908



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BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.

HEADQUARTERS NATIONAL GUARD OF ILLINOIS,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
SPRINGFIELD, October 1, 1908.

Honorable Charles S. Deneen, Governor and Commander-in-Chief:

SIR—I have the honor to submit herewith the biennial report of the Adjutant General's department for the period ended September 30, 1908. During that period just closed there has been a remarkable change in the National Guard of this State, the most marked of which, has been the strides taken toward efficiency and the assumption of a more professional air and the getting away from the amateur ideas of a soldier. The first steps toward that end were taken in the summer of 1906 when you ordered the 2nd infantry to the army maneuver camp at Fort Benjamin Harrison. The seeds sown at that camp took root very rapidly and there has been a greater demand for advancement in the guard during the past two years than ever before. The assembling of a battalion of the United States Army at our camp of instruction at Camp Lincoln in 1907 was the next step toward efficiency. The intense desire manifested by the officers and enlisted men to grasp the opportunity for a personal study of the professional soldier was a surprise and an awakening to all. The value of this innovation in the history of Illinois National Guard cannot be overestimated, it plainly demonstrated that the citizen soldier would learn if only given the opportunity. The officers and enlisted men entirely forgot the pleasures that were generally given over to at the annual encampments and bent all their energies to absorbing all the information possible in so short a time. The result of this camp, has been the demand of organizations to get away from the old rut and explore fields unknown only in active service. This year two regiments of infantry have taken a practice march of about forty miles in length and the cavalry regiment has also taken a practice march of about one hundred and seventy-five miles, this being the only National Guard Regiment of cavalry to undertake such a feat, and it was indeed a feat to be able to successfully conduct a march of this character throughout a settled country and have advance guard, rear guard, out post duty and problems of a more advanced nature, and to successfully carry this out in detail, without having any complaints from the inhabitants, is remarkable and shows the discipline of the command. Three infantry regiments and a detachment of the signal corps also

attended the army maneuver camp at Fort Benjamin Harrison and the results shown at that camp demonstrated that the officers and enlisted men have been hard at work perfecting themselves in the soldier's art. The organizations that have not as yet had an opportunity to participate in this camp should be given an opportunity to do so at the earliest possible date.

INSPECTIONS.

During the year 1907, all organizations were inspected during the annual tour of instruction by the Inspector General, also at the home stations by their regimental commanders and by officers detailed from the United States Army for that purpose. The same method was adopted in 1908 with the exception of the inspection by the Inspector General during the tour of instruction.

ORGANIZATION.

The organized militia of Illinois consists of a division commanded by Major General Edward C. Young, headquarters, 309 Monadnock Block, Chicago.

The Division is composed of:

Ninety-four companies of infantry (8 regiments).

Nine troops of cavalry (1 regiment).

Three batteries light artillery (1 battalion).

One signal company.

The Signal Corps, Cavalry and Artillery are not assigned to any Brigade.

Signal Corps—One company, Captain John W. McConnell, commanding. Headquarters and armory, Washington boulevard and Curtis street, Chicago.

First Cavalry—Nine troops, band and hospital corps, Colonel Milton, J. Foreman, commanding. Headquarters and troops A, C, E, F, I and band, 527 North Clark street, Chicago.

Troop B, Bloomington, McLean County.

Troop D, Springfield, Sangamon County.

Troop G, Peoria County.

Troop H, Macomb, McDonough County.

Artillery Battalion—Three batteries and band, Major Oscar P. Yeager, commanding. Headquarters, band and

Battery A, Danville, Vermillion County.

Battery B, Chicago, Cook County.

Battery C, Waukegan, Lake County.

The Infantry regiments are divided into three Brigades as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE.

Brigadier General D. Jack Foster, commanding. Headquarters, 311 Monadnock block, Chicago.

First Infantry—12 companies, band and hospital corps, Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn, commanding. Headquarters and armory, 16th street and Michigan avenue, Chicago.

Second Infantry—12 companies, band and hospital corps, Colonel John J. Garrity, commanding. Headquarters and armory, Washington boulevard and Curtis street, Chicago.

Seventh Infantry—12 companies, band and hospital corps, Colonel Daniel

Hospital Corps, Rockford, Winnebago County.
 Sixth Infantry—12 companies, band and hospital corps, Colonel Will T. Channon, commanding. Headquarters, Rock Island.
 Company A, Rock Island, Rock Island County.
 Company B, Geneseo, Henry County.
 Company C, Galesburg, Knox County.
 Company D, Oak Park, Cook County.
 Company E, Sterling, Whiteside County.
 Company F, Moline, Rock Island County.
 Company G, Dixon, Lee County.
 Company H, Monmouth, Warren County.
 Company I, Morrison, Whiteside County.
 Company K, Kewanee, Henry County.
 Company L, Freeport, Stephenson County.
 Company M, Galena, JoDavie County.
 Band, Sterling, Whiteside County.

The Hospital Corps are assigned to each regiment and unassigned battalion and are under control of the Surgeon General.

The Illinois Naval Reserve, Captain Warren F. Purdy, commanding. Headquarters, 20 Michigan avenue, Chicago, consists of ten divisions, two of which are engineering divisions, including the two engineering divisions located in Chicago, and the other four are located at Moline, Rock Island, Quincy and Alton. These organizations have the use of the U. S. S. Dorothea.

ACTUAL AND AUTHORIZED STRENGTH.

Herewith is published the annual report compiled by the Adjutant General and forwarded to the War Department, in accordance with the Act of Congress approved January 21, 1903, showing the actual and authorized strength of the organized militia for the year ended December 31, 1907:

ARMS, EQUIPMENT AND UNIFORMS.

Our organized militia is armed and equipped as follows:

The eight regiments of infantry are equipped with the U. S. Magazine Rifle, caliber 30, model 1903. The First Cavalry, with U. S. Magazine rifles, caliber 30, model 1903, cavalry sabres and revolvers caliber 38.

The Artillery, Batteries A and C with complete batteries of 3 inch field material.

Battery B with four 3-2 inch B. L. rifled cannon and caissons.

The Signal Corps with U. S. Magazine rifles, caliber 30, model 1903, flags, heliographs and other material pertaining to that branch of the service.

The Naval Reserve is equipped with Hotchkiss and Colts rapid fire guns, navy revolvers, cutlasses, Lee Metford and Krag-Jorgensen rifles.

The Medical Department is equipped with outfits suitable for each regiment establishing a hospital in the field.

The entire guard is fitted out with a dress and service uniform, the latter is made of cotton khaki; also shelter tents, ponchos and blankets, the only garment lacking being the overcoat, and I would respectfully urge that this necessary article be supplied as early as practicable.

granted, and in 907 for the same period we expended \$64,934.59 an increase of \$34,573.24, this made it necessary to devise some means to meet this expense and the United States Government allotment for arms, equipments, etc., was used to make up the deficiency, hence the guard has had to do without equipment that could have been secured if this increase had not been incurred.

I would respectfully recommend to the incoming General Assembly that some measure be passed that will give us relief in this particular.

TROOPS ON ACTIVE DUTY.

During the year 1907 no trouble of any character occurred, but on August 14, 1908 a riot of most serious character broke out in the city of Springfield and before the guard could be assembled great damage to life and property had been incurred. Your promptness in assembling the guard restored the peace of the community and convinced the lawless element that a reign of terror cannot exist in the State of Illinois.

The following schedule shows the time of arrival and departure of the different organizations, which were present during this tour of duty:

Troop D, 1st Cavalry, 8 P. M. Aug. 15-21.
 Company C, 5th Infantry, 8 P. M. Aug. 14-20.
 Gatling Platoon, 5th Infantry, 8 P. M. Aug. 14-20.
 Company H, 5th Infantry, 2:20 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company F, 3d Infantry, 2:45 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company A, 5th Infantry, 3:00 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company G, 5th Infantry, 3:00 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company L, 5th Infantry, 3:00 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Troop C, 1st Cavalry, 3:00 A. M. Aug. 15-21.
 Company D, 5th Infantry, 3:05 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Troop B, 1st Cavalry, 3:05 A. M. Aug. 15-21.
 Company I, 5th Infantry, 5:57 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company F, 5th Infantry, 6:10 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company B, 5th Infantry, 6:28 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company M, 4th Infantry, 7:00 A. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company E, 5th Infantry, 8:40 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company K, 5th Infantry, 9:30 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company M, 5th Infantry, 9:30 A. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company A, 4th Infantry, 12:30 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company D, 4th Infantry, 3:00 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company H, 4th Infantry, 3:00 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company C, 4th Infantry, 4:00 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company B, 3rd Infantry, 4:15 P. M. Aug. 15-20.
 Company I, 4th Infantry, 6:00 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 First Infantry, first section, 9:20 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company L, 3rd Infantry, 9:50 P. M. Aug. 15-20.
 First Infantry, second section, 9:50 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company B, 4th Infantry, 10:00 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company L, 4th Infantry, 10:00 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Company F, 4th Infantry, 11:00 P. M. Aug. 15-19.
 Second Infantry, 3:30 P. M. Aug. 16-20.
 Seventh Infantry, 10:40 P. M. Aug. 16-26.
 Troops A, C, E, F and I, 1st Cavalry, 3:45 A. M. Aug. 17-21.

Field and Staff.

Uniforms, arms and accoutrements in excellent condition.
 Officers exceptionally well mounted.
 Lieutenant Colonel with dress saber knot.
 Regimental Adjutant sick in quarters.
 Captain Quartermaster without saber knot.
 Vacancy, First Lieutenant, and Assistant Surgeon.
 Regimental non-commissioned staff well prepared.

Colors.

National and State flags new, of excellent quality, and in perfect condition. The national colors have not been emblazoned, as other regiments have done, contrary to the rules.

First Squadron.

Officers well mounted, with uniforms and arms according to regulation.
 Vacancy for Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant.

Second Squadron.

Officers well mounted.
 Uniforms and arms regulation.
 Trumpeter Alber Acker worthy of honorable mention.

A Troop.

Aggregate: Fifty-two officers and men.
 Present: Forty-one officers and men.
 Special duty: Five stable; five dismounts; one Quartermaster mess detail.
 First Lieutenant without saber knot.
 Carbine No. 307,817, screw rear sight missing.
 Several troopers without spurs.
 Private J. Daley injured by troop horse, in line of duty.
 Troop well prepared for inspection.
 Quarters and street orderly.

B Troop.

Aggregate: Forty-seven officers and men.
 Present: Thirty-six officers and men.
 Special duty: Two mess detail; two stable; four sick in quarters; one detached duty; two not accounted for by First Sergeant.
 Second Lieutenant with dress saddle cloth.
 Carbine No. 355,232, screw missing rear sight.
 Troop not thoroughly prepared for inspection.
 Arms and uniforms in fair condition.
 Many men not recently shaved.
 Nineteen hat cords short.
 Quarters orderly; troop street well policed.

C Troop.

Aggregate: Fifty-six officers and men.
 Present: Forty-two officers and men.
 Special duty: Three stable; two orderlies; six sick in hospital; three in quarters.
 Troop well prepared; officers efficient. Uniforms, arms and accoutrements in very good order.
 Mounts very fair.
 Carbine No. 345,869, frone sight broken off.
 Carbine No. 336,861, screw missing rear sight.
 Five saber knots short.
 Private L. R. Mundelius kicked by horse, while in line of duty; right shin bone splintered.
 Quarters neatly dressed; troop street well policed.

D Troop.

Aggregate: Forty-five officers and men.

Present: Forty-one officers and men.

Special duty: One picket; one mess; one detached; one sick in hospital.

Captain gave command "prepare for inspection march."

Troop well prepared for inspection with uniforms, arms and accoutrements in good condition.

Officers and men well mounted, horses well selected, and in excellent condition.

Two saber knots and few spurs required.

An excellent troop.

Quarters neatly and uniformly dressed; street well policed.

E Troop.

Aggregate: Forty-seven officers and men.

Present: Forty officers and men.

Special duty: One Quartermaster's Department; two stable; four sick in quarters.

Uniforms, accoutrements and carbines in vary fair condition. Sabers need attention, many blades being very rusty.

Carbine No. 335,471, rear sight screw missing.

Carbine No. 382,095, rear sight missing.

E Troop.

One vacancy for duty Sergeant.

Ten men in ranks at inspection chewing tobacco and expectorating.

One trooper in quarters, suffering from poisoned ivy; one trooper in quarters, suffering from horse kick; one trooper in quarters suffering from injuries from saddle pommel.

The horses of this command have been well selected, are in excellent condition, and are the best troop horses in the regiment.

Quarters uniformly dressed; street well policed.

F Troop.

Aggregate: Forty-six officers and men.

Present: Forty officers and men.

Special duty: Two rifle range; two stables; one charge of quarters; one sick in quarters.

Uniforms, arms and accoutrements in good condition.

One saber hilt broken off.

Two saber knots short.

Sergeant Left Guide, without coat; mounted on a horse blind in both eyes.

Troop generally weel prepared for inspection; horses serviceable.

Quarters and troop street very orderly and well policed.

G Troop.

Aggregate: Forty-four officers and men.

Present: Thirty-six officers and men.

Special duty: Four stables; two mess; two in troop street.

Captain gave commands without saber drawn.

Vacancy Second Lieutenant.

Vacancy Duty Sergeant.

Uniforms, arms and accoutrements in fair condition.

Carbine No. 355,600, rear sight screw missing.

Mounts generally very inferior, several being scrub horses and unfit for cavalry service. Two horses especially bad and unserviceable.

Troop quarters and street orderly.

REPORTS OF RIOTS AT SPRINGFIELD, ILL., AUGUST, 1908.

REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD C. YOUNG, COMMANDING THE
DIVISION.

Adjutant General, State of Illinois, Springfield, Illinois.

SIR—I have the honor to submit the following report of that part of the Division, Illinois National Guard, on duty during the Springfield riots, from August 14th, 1908, to August 20, 1908.

That portion of my report from August 14th to August 15th, 6:00 o'clock P. M., at which time I took personal command, is taken from reports of General Wells, commanding Second brigade, Captain O'Brien, commanding Company C, 5th infantry, and Captain Walz, 1st cavalry.

On the afternoon of August 14th, a large mob gathered at the county jail to demand two negroes who were then in the jail, on charges of having committed crimes. These men, however, were secretly removed, and the crowd, or a portion of it, gathered in front of Loper's restaurant. After a time, the mob became violent, burned up Loper's automobile and completely destroyed his restaurant. They then passed along East Washington street, doing considerable damage to property, and from there to the district known as the "Bad Lands," where saloons were broken into, many houses robbed and burned, and one negro, Scott Burton, was hanged. A reign of terror existed from about dark until 3:00 A. M., the next morning, during which time much property was destroyed, many people were injured and several lives were lost.

Company C of the 5th infantry and Troop D, 1st cavalry, were ordered to assemble in their armories at about 6:00 o'clock. At 7:30, by orders of the commander in chief, through Colonel Shaud, these troops were ordered to report at the county jail to Sheriff Werner for duty. The jail at this time was completely surrounded by a mob, estimated at anywhere from five to ten thousand people. The sheriff gave orders to clear the streets; the mob showed considerable resistance, throwing bricks and other missiles, some of which struck the troops, but did no serious injury. Volleys were fired at this juncture, two in number, over the heads of the mob. This quieted the mob for a time.

In the meantime, other troops were ordered to Springfield. General Wells received his order at about 11:00 P. M. and arrived at Springfield at 2:20 A. M. with H company, 5th infantry. Company H, 5th infantry and Troop D, 1st cavalry, were at once sent north on Seventh street to Jefferson; then east to Eighth street and north to Madison street. At this point the troops came in contact with the mob, which was burning houses on both sides of Madison street. The mob was forced back to Twelfth street, and it there made a more determined stand, refusing to disperse. After the sheriff had ordered the mob to disperse and they refused to do so, one volley, by his command was fired over the heads of the rioters, and one volley was fired at the ground in front of the mob. These volleys had no other effect than to incite among the mob jeers and threats. A third volley, at com-

mand of the sheriff, was fired at the knees of the mob, wounding quite a number. This volley dispersed them, and there was no further serious violence that night. When the troops arrived at Twelfth and Madison street, they found a colored man, Scott Burton, hanging to a tree; the body was cut down after the mob was dispersed.

At this time, Major Strawn of the 3rd infantry, with Company F of the 3rd infantry, arrived. Patrols were sent out through the burned districts to protect life and property, to assist in putting out fires and maintaining order.

During the day of the 15th, other troops which had been ordered out were constantly arriving. I received orders direct from the Commander in Chief by telephone at about 9:30 on the morning of the 15th to report at Springfield, also to direct the 1st infantry to proceed at once for riot duty to Springfield. At that time I was informed by the Commander-in-Chief that all of the 5th infantry, 9 companies of the 4th, 3 companies of the 3rd and 3 troops of the 1st cavalry had been ordered to Springfield.

I arrived in Springfield with my aide, Captain McCalla, at 4:15. I reported at once to the Commander-in-Chief, where I found him in consultation with the sheriff and mayor, General Wells and Adjutant General Scott. After this conference I was placed in command by the Commander-in-Chief.

General Wells reported to me the disposition he had already ordered for the troops which had then reported. I gave him verbal instructions to proceed with his disposition until I could take active command. I reported at the jail and took command at about 6:00 P. M. The following disposition of troops was made or in process of being made, at that time:

Fifteenth and Grand—Four companies of infantry—A, C. E. of the 5th; L of the 3rd.

E. Springfield, or Eighteenth and Kansas—Four companies of infantry—A, G. H and M of the 4th.

Third and Carpenter streets—Three companies of infantry—M of the 5th, D and I of the 4th.

"Bad Lands"—Six companies—B, G, I, L, of the 5th; B and F of the 3rd.

Camp Lincoln—D and H of the 5th.

County Jail—K of the 5th; L of the 4th and Troops B, D and G of the 1st cavalry.

Total number of companies and troops—24; about 1,000 officers and men.

Guards were also sent to the negro churches, to 1105 North Fifth street, the home of Mrs. Mabel Hallam, to the Concordia college, the Industrial Home, to the electric power house and to St. John's hospital. Each company was directed to send patrols out and cover certain sections of the district to which they were assigned. The object was to protect those districts of the city inhabited by colored people, and the sheriff advised me that this disposition fully protected all such districts. I made special inquiry as to other districts and particularly as to the southwest district of the city and was informed that nothing but white people lived in this section and that there was no reason to apprehend trouble. It was deemed best, with the number of troops on hand, to strongly protect the dangerous points, and not scatter the troops too much by attempting to cover those sections of the city where trouble was unlikely to occur, except by patrols.

The First infantry was expected to arrive and should have arrived, had not the Illinois Central railroad failed to make a prompt run, at about 7:30. I was informed by the Springfield agent of the I. C. R. R. company that they would arrive at 8:00 o'clock, and had planned to use one battalion of this infantry to guard the southwest section, one battalion at the public square, and one battalion for reserve at the county jail. As a matter of fact, the first section of this regiment arrived at 9:20 P. M. and the second section about one-half hour later, too late to be available for the duties as planned.

I was advised about 7:00 o'clock that very few colored people had reported at Camp Lincoln, where arrangements had been made for caring for

them, and where two companies had been stationed, but that they were seeking asylum at the State arsenal in large numbers. At this hour Troop D and the Gatling section were guarding the arsenal. After conferring with the commander in chief, it was decided to give them asylum at the arsenal and to protect them I ordered Companies D and H, 5th infantry, Major Cassell, 5th infantry, commanding, to leave a small detachment at Camp Lincoln and proceed at once to the arsenal. They arrived there about 7:30. About 200 colored people had entered the arsenal.

Crowds had at this hour gathered at many places in the city and particularly in the downtown districts, most of whom appeared to be actuated by idle curiosity. I had been advised by General Wells that the sheriff and chief of police would look after the business section of the city, but when I inquired as to why the crowds were allowed to gather there, I was advised by the sheriff that he had no men at his command to disperse them, and that I would have to do so. I accordingly sent out one of the reserve troops—Troop B, 1st cavalry, for this purpose. After dispersing the crowds this troop reported back to the jail. About one half of Troop D had been mounted and they were sent to disperse a mob at 7:30 P. M. at Eleventh and Cook streets, and a little later at Twelfth and Jackson street, then reporting back to the county jail.

In the mean time, a very large and apparently violent mob, about 1,000, gathered at the arsenal. Major Cassell reported this to me and requested reinforcements. Company L of the 4th infantry, and Troop D, 1st cavalry, were sent to reinforce him. Before their arrival, however, Major Cassell succeeded in dispersing most of this mob with the troops at his command. It broke up and scattered in different directions. A little later, he received word that another and larger mob was going in the direction of the arsenal. This he also reported to me. This proved to be unfounded, however, and it was undoubtedly the same mob that was first reported.

Shortly afterwards I received information that a part of the mob originally dispersed at the arsenal had gone across the state house grounds and were proceeding in the direction of Spring and Edwards. I sent out the mounted portion of Troop D and directed Major Cassell to send out the two companies with which he had been reinforced, as he stated that the mob had dispersed sufficiently for him to hold the situation with his other two companies, and to follow and disperse this mob at any cost. When Troop D arrived at Spring and Charles streets, a large mob filled the street. After clearing the street, it was observed there was a large mob at Spring and Edwards, one block further south. Arriving there, they found a body hanging to a small tree, which proved to be that of an aged negro, named Donnegan, whose home was located directly across the street. Attempts had been made to fire this building, but the mob was at once dispersed by the troop. A police patrol arrived and took possession of the body.

The troops under Major Cassell met mounted Troop D on the way out and were informed that the mob had been dispersed at that point and that a portion of it was going toward the court house on Washington street. Major Cassell sent Troop B and Company L of the 4th infantry in pursuit of them, and returned to the arsenal with the mounted troop.

At this time, about 9:00 P. M., I received a report that a mob was proceeding to the southwest section of the city, in the direction of Pasfield avenue and Williams, where it was learned a considerable negro settlement was located. I had recalled two companies from the "Bad Lands" and sent one of these, B, 5th infantry, by street car, to this section. When they arrived they found everything quiet, and after thoroughly patrolling the district and reporting the location of the negro settlement, were directed to remain and patrol the district for the balance of the night. A mob was also reported in the vicinity of the gas house, and Lieutenant Colonel Abbott, Chief Ordnance officer, 2nd brigade, with one company and one-half troop of dismounted cavalry, went in this direction. They were joined by the mounted portion of Troop D. The troop was cut off by the Chicago & Alton train

time for night service. They arrived at 3:30 P. M. At the same time, the Seventh Infantry was ordered to rendezvous at its armory in Chicago and await instructions.

On Sunday morning, we found the following conditions:

First—The citizens were in a state of great alarm on account of the fact that they had received threatening letters and telephone calls warning them that their property would be burned if they did not discharge their colored employes, and there were, therefore, many demands for individual protection of life and property. Many threats had also been made against negro families and settlements.

Second—Many of the troops were almost exhausted on account of the fact that they had been on constant guard for two nights and many of them had no sleep for forty-eight hours. The heat was also extreme.

Third—A miners' strike in the mines adjacent to Springfield was threatened on account of the refusal of the white miners to work with the negroes.

Considering these conditions, and upon a further consultation between the Commander in Chief, the Adjutant General and myself, the Seventh Infantry and First Cavalry were ordered to report at Springfield. These orders were issued about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, August 16th. These troops arrived about three o'clock on the morning of the 17th.

I at once took up plans for a thorough patrol and guard of the city. I organized a Provisional Division, placing General Wells in command on the First Provisional Brigade,—consisting of the Fifth Infantry, 9 companies of the Fourth Infantry and 3 companies of the Third Infantry organized as a Provisional Regiment, and 2 troops of Cavalry.

The Second Provisional Brigade was placed under command of Colonel Sanborn, First Infantry, and consisted of the First Infantry and the Second Infantry. The Gatling Section was assigned to this Brigade.

The city was divided into two districts, with Seventh street, north and south, as the dividing line. General Wells was placed in charge of the eastern district, with headquarters at the county jail and Colonel Sanborn in charge of the western district, with headquarters at the State Arsenal. Each district was sub-divided into two sections, with Washington street, running east and west, as the dividing line. The northeast section was placed in command of Colonel Wood, Fifth Infantry, with headquarters at the public school building at 13th and Mason street: the southeast section was placed under command of Colonel Lang, Fourth Infantry, headquarters at 18th and Kansas streets.

The northwest section was guarded and patrolled by two battalions of the First Infantry, under command of Colonel Eddy. One battalion of the First Infantry was stationed at the city square. One company from this regiment was detailed as a special reserve at my headquarters, county jail.

Two battalions of the Second Infantry, under Colonel Garrity, guarded and patrolled the southwest section, and one battalion was held as a reserve at the Brigade Headquarters, State arsenal.

D Troop, First Cavalry, mounted, was also detailed to Division Headquarters, and two troops were detailed as reserves to General Wells.

The commander of each section of the city was directed to send out outposts and patrols so as to thoroughly control the district his command and each officer was advised that he would be responsible for the good order of such district.

The First Provisional Brigade consisted of 1,201 officers and men, and the Second Provisional Brigade consisted of 1,154 officers and men: Division Headquarters, including Troop D, 47 officers and men; total, officers and men, 2,402.

Each command was directed to have its disposition made so that the men would be in position before dark.

During the day, Sunday, many strangers arrived from out of town, but everything was orderly, with the exception that during the afternoon, three

different fires, which appeared to be of incendiary origin, occurred. The troops arrived in each case at the scene of these fires ahead of the fire department, and assisted it in putting out the fires, so that no damage of importance occurred.

During the day, all sections of the city not in the immediate vicinity of troops was covered by patrols. Very stringent orders were issued that no crowds be allowed to collect at any point, no matter what might be the excuse. The troops were informed as to the law relative to mobs and riots and no crowds were allowed to gather. All who failed to move on promptly when directed to do so were placed in arrest and taken to the county jail and the police station: a number of whom, who appeared to be of suspicious character, were held.

In addition to the regular outposts and patrols, a flying squadron was organized, consisting of 6 depot wagons, in which were placed a squad of eight men and a deputy sheriff. These were used to answer alarms from different sections of the city and to investigate all reports that came in. It was found, the night before, that the troops were very much harassed and worn out by answering calls which turned out to be of no importance. This flying squadron was used very frequently on Sunday night, thereby saving the troops very much, although the reports were in every instance unfounded.

So thoroughly was the city covered on Sunday night that everything remained quiet, with the exception of occasional shots, some of which were fired from ambush at our sentinels and some of which were return fire by our sentinels. Also, occasional shots were fired to force those to stop who failed to obey the commands of the sentinels.

On the arrival of the Seventh Infantry, it was assigned to the Second Brigade, and General Foster with his Staff also having reported, Colonel Sanborn was relieved of the command and General Foster placed in command of his own Brigade,—consisting of the First Infantry, Second Infantry and Seventh Infantry.

The First Cavalry was assigned to Division Headquarters.

The total strength, with the addition of these regiments, was 3,691 officers and men. Detailed statement by organizations is hereto attached.

No changes were made in the disposition of the troops in the eastern district, with the exception that reserve companies held at General Wells' Headquarters were assigned to their regiments and the Cavalry used as a reserve.

Nothing of importance occurred during the day of Monday (August, 17th). Monday night was comparatively quiet, with the exception of the usual number of false alarms, and it seemed evident that law and order had been restored and that troops might safely be withdrawn: the First Infantry and Fourth Infantry were therefore ordered to return on Wednesday morning to their home stations. The First Cavalry was then assigned to the command of General Wells.

Tuesday night having remained quiet, orders were issued for the Fifth Infantry, Second Infantry and Fifth Infantry to return to their home stations on Thursday morning.

Friday morning, the First Cavalry was relieved and ordered to return to its home station, leaving the Seventh Infantry only. On this day, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I relinquished command and returned to my home station, Chicago.

These facts are worthy of comment:

First—The rapidity with which the regiments mobilized at their armories ready for duty. All of the Chicago regiments were in complete heavy marching order, ready for active field service, within from three to five hours after the Colonel received his orders. The troops outside of Chicago, being stationed in smaller organizations, were able to leave their home stations within from one to two hours after receiving their orders, and the only delays at any time were due to the slowness of the railroad companies in furnishing trans-

portation and delays en route to Springfield. This experience gave full evidence that the National Guard of Illinois is prepared at all times to promptly perform its duty.

The second noticeable fact was the splendid discipline of the troops. Their conduct was so fine and the performance of their duties so faithful that they commended themselves to all lawabiding citizens of Springfield, who praised them in unmeasured terms.

Third—After so much grave and serious rioting and disorder, complete law and order were so quickly restored.

The details of the outbreak of the riot and its progress during Friday night and Saturday morning are given in full in Colonel Shand's report, which is attached hereto. From this report, it is evident that the civil authorities were very loath to accept the assistance of the military authorities, and that very urgent action was made necessary on the part of the Commander in Chief to induce the acceptance of military assistance, although it is quite evident that the civil authorities were in no wise prepared to maintain order.

Special attention should be called to the failure of the Illinois Central Railroad Company to properly transport troops. The necessity was impressed upon them in a most thorough manner and the Commanding Officer of the First Infantry advised me that he used every possible endeavor to induce them to make a fast run, but, notwithstanding this, such indifferent attention was given that it took this train one hour longer than the usual trains between Chicago and Springfield. Under the circumstances, their carelessness was almost criminal.

With respect to the mutual relations between the civil and military authority—there was not a little uncertainty, on the first night of the riot, as to the interpretation of the law. Art. XII, Par. 3, Military and Naval Code, states that "orders from civil officers—shall contain only the *specific act* to be performed," and provides that the *manner* of performance shall be left to discretion of the military commander. It appears from Colonel Shand's report that the sheriff dictated whether or not troops should fire at all, and if so, whether at the mob or over their heads. It is not believed that the words "specific act" are intended to cover any technical operations: but should be confined to an order to suppress the disorder at one or more places: *firing* is clearly one of the means that the law places in the discretion of the military commander. I believe that it is fully in the province of the military commander to determine when force should be used, the amount of force required and the particular method of force to be adopted. I acted upon this assumption during the time that I was in command, and instructed the commanding officers that their mission was to maintain law and order, protect life and property and to use whatever force in their judgment was necessary to accomplish this purpose and particularly not to hesitate to use effective force in the presence of violence or resistance. If, however, there is any doubt about the law, it should be amended to give full protection to officers in the performance of their duty and should more fully define the rights of the military commander. I suggest that the law and decisions as it stands at present be determined by the Judge Advocate's Department and that instructions be issued to officers.

A soldier, Private Klein of the First Infantry, while guarding the baggage car of the train of the First Infantry en route from Chicago to Springfield, Illinois, had to use force in ejecting a trespasser in the baggage car at Kankakee, Illinois, which resulted in the death of the trespasser. A court of Inquiry was ordered upon the arrival of the regiment at Springfield, and the evidence as presented to this Court proved clearly that the Guard was acting in obedience to his orders. This young man entered the car where valuable baggage belonging to the regiment was stored, and when ordered to leave the car, not only refused to do so, but attempted to strike the Guard, whereupon the Guard thrust him with his bayonet. It is my opinion, from all evidence, that it was clearly a case of excusable, if not justifiable, homicide. Efforts

were made to arrest this guard while on duty with his regiment, but upon the opinion of the Attorney General's Department, in which it was stated that the giving up of a prisoner under such circumstances was subject to the discretion of the commanding officer, I declined to give him up, as I believed that such action on my part would have totally demoralized the troops and would have been clear indication that soldiers need not expect protection in the performance of their duty. After the riots were over, and arrangements for bond and legal advice having been made, I voluntarily turned over Private Klein to the civil authorities at Kankakee, Illinois.

I wish to express my appreciation for the support, active assistance and valuable suggestions of the Commander in Chief while in the performance of my duty under very difficult circumstances.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

EDW. C. YOUNG,

Major General.

TROOPS IN SERVICE AT SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, AUGUST 14, TO AUGUST 21, 1908.

	OFFICERS.	MEN.
The Division	10	4
First Brigade	9	
Second Brigade	8	
First Infantry	49	584
Second Infantry	48	540
Third Infantry (3 companies)	12	135
Fourth Infantry (9 companies)	41	478
Fifth Infantry	49	662
Seventh Infantry	53	580
First Cavalry (8 Troops)	39	389
Totals	318	3,373
Aggregate		3,691

REPORT OF COLONEL RICHINGS J. SHAND, COMMANDING THIRD INFANTRY.

Commanding General. The Division, Illinois National Guard, Chicago, Illinois.

SIR—I have the honor to report that at 4:30 P. M., Friday, August 14, 1908, Captain H. H. Tuttle, Assistant Surgeon, Fourth Infantry, called me on the phone and asked if the Department were aware of the conditions around the county jail, and the threats that had been made in reference to the lynching of two colored persons contained therein, one charged with rape and the other with murder. He stated it had been reported to him that it was the intention of the mob to storm the jail and lynch the two aforesaid prisoners. Upon receipt of this information, the Commander in Chief was immediately notified and directed me to consult with the sheriff in reference to calling out that portion of the National Guard located in the city of Springfield, and such other force as the sheriff might deem necessary. I immediately went to the county jail and was informed by the sheriff that he did not consider the situation at all serious, and there was no necessity of ordering out any troops. It was made clear to him that he was responsible for the peace of the county, that he was placing himself in the position of rejecting the offer of assistance from the Governor of Illinois, and should any riot occur, the responsibility would rest alone on him. He stated that if we desired we could assemble a company, but upon being informed that he must take the initiative himself or none would be assembled, he made verbal request for the assembling of